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Pam. Watson, John.*

THEOLOGICAL ALUMNI CONFERENCE
OF QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY.

THE CHANCELLOR'S LECTURESHIP :
SESSION 1898-9.

PHILO AND THE NEW TESTAMENT.

SYNOPSIS OF LECTURES
WITH EXTRACTS FROM PHILO.

PREPARED BY
JOHN WATSON, LL.D.,
PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY.

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NOTE.

The SYNOPSIS OF LECTURES and EXTRACTS FROM PHILO have been prepared for the purpose of making the Lectures more profitable to those who attend, and as an introduction to a subject of great importance to students of the development of Christian doctrine. It is hoped that members of the Conference may be led to follow up independently the line of investigation here indicated, and that they will read at least one treatise of Philo, if possible in the original. Perhaps the best treatise to begin with is the *De Mundi Opificio*.

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PHILO AND THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I. SYNOPSIS OF LECTURES.*

The main object of the Lectures is to determine how far there is a similarity of method and ideas between Philo and New Testament writers, and, if so, what is the explanation of the similarity. Hardly less important is the question as to the essential difference between them; for two writers may present striking resemblances in their general mode of expression and in special phrases, and may yet be widely apart in their theory of life. To answer these questions intelligently demands some familiarity with the writings of Philo. As a convenient introduction to the subject, part of the treatise on *The Mosaic Account of Creation* will be carefully examined.

A. Philo's Theory of Creation.

In § 1 of this work Philo expresses his belief that the Pentateuch contains a complete and final revelation. This belief extends to the Septuagint, every word and even letter of which he regards as inspired. The modern distinction between scientific and religious truth he would have rejected as impious. For him the Mosaic writings contain a complete philosophy or theology, and this he

*It is hoped that members of the Conference will make themselves familiar with the *Synopsis* and the *Extracts*.

regards as the main superiority of Moses over all other law-givers. This view he seeks to establish by the method of allegory, a method which was borrowed from Greek writers, and in Philo's time was generally accepted by Graeco-Jewish thinkers. By the use of this method Philo is enabled to find in scripture the philosophical doctrines which he has borrowed from his Greek teachers. The result is an extraordinary commingling of Greek and Jewish ideas.

Accordingly, the account of creation contained in Genesis is characterized in terms borrowed from the Platonic philosophy. The world is first produced in the Divine Mind, and is thus the archetype of the visible universe. Philo, while holding fast by the Jewish conception of God as transcending all finite existence, unconsciously transforms it, under the influence of Greek ideas, into the very different conception of God as the Architect or Former of the world, not its Creator. Hence for him 'matter' is uncreated and eternal. The 'beauty' of the cosmos is not comprehensible by the ordinary mind, but it is visible at times to those who attain by philosophical contemplation to the state of 'enthusiasm'. Even they, however, never reach that fulness of divine illumination, and consequent infallibility of utterance, which was granted to the biblical writers, and above all to Moses; and hence every word of Moses has a deep spiritual meaning.

While Philo admits the eternity of 'matter,' he rejects as impious the prevalent view of the Greek poets and

philosophers, that the 'world' is eternal (§ 2). Such a doctrine denies the *creative activity* and the *providence* of God. In proof of the former he employs the argument from 'design', which he extracts from scripture by his usual allegorical method; interpreting the statement that 'the spirit of God moved upon the water' as meaning that 'God acted upon unformed matter'. This doctrine is already implied in the *Wisdom of Solomon*; and, as we may conclude, was an accepted belief in Philo's time. The eternity of the world, again, is subversive of the providence of God, because that which already exists apart from the creative energy of God, must be entirely independent of Him. Hence Philo here employs what Kant calls the 'cosmological' argument: the finite and changing presupposes the infinite and unchanging. Philo, however, absolutely separates the energy of God from its manifestation in the world, and therefore he has to attempt to connect the one with the other by the interposition of subordinate 'powers'.

In the next paragraph (§ 3), we have a good instance of Philo's method. In our time the 'six days' of creation have been held by some to mean 'six ages'. Philo has a more trenchant method of reconciling his philosophical creed with the text of scripture. In his view God cannot be truly represented as acting in time, and therefore he holds that the 'six days' of creation are meant to indicate the order of *superiority* in the visible universe, not the order of *time*. The 'heavens' are said to have been created 'first,' because they are 'the first', i.e. the

'highest' of all created things. Further, there is a mystical significance in the 'six'; for 'six,' as Philo learned from the Pythagoreans, is a 'perfect' number, and, as at once male and female (odd and even) it is 'productive' or 'generative'; hence, it was intentionally chosen as the number expressive of the 'perfect creation.'

This interpretation, Philo argues (§ 4), is confirmed by the use of the term 'one day' (*ἡμέρα μία*); for this signifies the absolute 'oneness' of the 'intelligible' or 'ideal' cosmos—the cosmos existing in the Divine Mind. Hence the beginning of Genesis (chap. i) gives an account of the eternal creation of the *archetypal world*, not of the *visible universe*. If further proof were needed, does not Moses speak of the earth as 'invisible and unformed' (*ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασχεύαστος*)—showing that he was speaking of the 'ideal' earth, the earth as it existed in the Divine Mind prior to the formation of the 'visible' earth?

Philo, therefore, proceeds (§ 5) to explain the creation of the world by an elaborate comparison of the Creator to a human architect. No doubt he warns us that the analogy is imperfect; but the reason he gives is that God, as separated from the world, is incomprehensible. This is the real explanation of his continual practice of falling back upon metaphors, which explain nothing.

The divine 'powers,' already mentioned, constitute the Divine Reason. The sensible world, however, as Philo now explains, does not bear the impress of the complete nature of God, but only of his 'goodness' (§ 6). The

same thought had already appeared in the *Wisdom of Solomon*. This is an instance in which Philo's Jewish belief overmastered his Greek training ; for ' the good ' in Plato is another term for the perfection of God, not a special attribute. Philo's explanation of this limitation in the manifestation of God is that, while the divine love is infinite, the finite is unable to receive all that God is willing to bestow. That the world is an imperfect copy of the ideal world Philo finds to be the teaching of scripture, in which we read that man was ' made after the image of God ' ; i.e., man is a ' copy ' of the ' image of God ',—in other words, of the ' ideal ' man, as he exists in the Divine Mind. And as man is only a part of the visible universe, we must infer that the whole universe is a copy of the ideal universe ; which, again, is the product of the divine ' powers '. Thus Philo seeks to preserve the absoluteness and inscrutability of the Divine nature, while claiming that God is the ultimate Cause of all things.

Convinced that the account in Genesis of the first day of creation must refer to the origin, not of the ' sensible ' but of the ' ideal ' world, Philo proceeds to show that from it we may gain some idea of the various parts of this ideal world in the order of their rank (§ 7). The creation of the ' ideal ' world is not in time ; for time, as the succession of states exhibited by the heavens in its revolution, could not exist prior to the creation of the visible heavens. The heavens are first in rank or ideal beauty, and this is what is meant by " in the beginning God made the heavens."

From this analysis of the opening of Philo's treatise we see that his ideas revolve around certain central points,—(1) the absoluteness of God, (2) the divine λόγος, (3) the visible creation, including man. We shall now consider these points more particularly, so far as they bear upon the parallelism of Philo and the New Testament.

B. God, the Λόγος, and Man.

1. Philo affirms, in the most unqualified way, that it is impossible for man to comprehend the nature of God (Extracts A). This, he thinks, is proved by Deut. xxxii, 39 : "Behold, behold that I am"; which indicates that, while we may know *that* God is, we cannot know *what* He is. As incomprehensible God is inexpressible. When Moses asked by what name he should designate Him who sent him, the answer was: "I am He who is" (Exodus iii, 14); i.e., "It is my nature to *be*, not to be *named*". Hence God is said to be without qualities. "He who thinks that God has qualities injures himself, not God". Philo, however, did not mean that God is purely abstract, but only that all the predicates by which created things are characterized are inadequate to express the Infinite. Thus Philo's doctrine alternates, like the substance of Spinoza, between the absolutely indeterminate and the infinitely determinate. He is really committed, by the logic of his system to the former, but he *means* to assert the latter. God is absolutely one and indivisible; but, though He exists beyond creation, He has filled the world with Himself. The mediating idea between God and the world is the Λόγος, which we must now consider.

2. In ordinary usage the term *λόγος* means either (a) thought, or (b) speech. Philo makes use of this double meaning to explain the relation between the intelligible and the sensible world (Extracts B). Thought and speech in man are related to each other as the Divine Thought to its Expression in the visible universe. Thus the *λόγος* is the Word of God, i.e., the order impressed upon the sensible world. Hence man, in grasping by his intelligence the order exhibited in the visible universe, may attain to *truth*, or to a symbolical apprehension of the Divine Thought. The *λόγος* is the 'instrument' of creation, while God is its 'cause'. Hence the visible world is represented as a vast temple or city, the form of which is impressed upon it by the *λόγος*, just as the architect embodies his thought in his work. The *λόγος* is therefore intermediate between God and man; it is 'neither unbegotten as God, nor begotten as man', but is eternally begotten.

As the expressed Thought or Word of God, it is called the 'eldest' or 'first-born Son of God' (Extracts C). It is the 'bond' of all things, i.e., the principle which constitutes the world an ordered system. The *λόγος* or Word is also the law which determines the course of human life. Hence the *λόγος* is called the 'man of God' or the 'heavenly man', who is distinguished from Adam, the earthly man'. Philo also speaks of the *λόγος* as the 'second God', because it is not God as He is in himself, but the product or 'image' of God.

There are other ways in which the *λόγος* is characterized, which are drawn from Jewish sources. Thus

the *λόγος* is a suppliant or intercessor (*ἱκέτης*) to God on behalf of man (Extracts D). It is natural, therefore, to speak of it as the 'high priest,' who mediates between God and man. To these striking parallels with the New Testament may be added (1) the *λόγος* as the manna, the bread that came down from heaven, (2) the living stream, (3) the sword that turned every way, or the 'divider', (4) the cloud at the Red Sea, (5) the rock in the wilderness.

Philo *personifies* the *λόγος*, but he can hardly be said to conceive of it as a *person*. No doubt he identifies it with the angelic or divine appearances mentioned in scripture, but he interprets these as symbols of the divine Reason.

In treating of the kindred notion of the Law (Extracts E) Philo speaks in a way that strongly reminds us of some of St. Paul's ideas. The Law (*νόμος*) is nothing but the Word (*λόγος*); so that the righteous man who keeps the Law also keeps the Word. Philo further tells us that to obey the Law is freedom, while subjection to passion is slavery. The Law he further characterizes as 'an eternal law, stamped by the immortal nature on the immortal mind', which reminds us of the Pauline conception of a law written on 'the fleshly tables of the heart'. The most striking parallel, however, is in the conception of the *λόγος* as the *ἐλεγχος*, the convincer of sin; where the Mosaic law has fallen into the background, and the reason or conscience is viewed as the divine *λόγος*, in so far as it takes up its abode in the soul of man.

3. Coming now to the nature of man, we find that Philo holds the soul to be separate and distinct from the body (Extracts F). This view is connected with the doctrine of the *λόγος* by the idea that in his reason man is an "ectype or fragment or spark of that blessed nature, while in the structure of his body he is connected with the rest of the world". The soul being thus a stranger, dwelling in an alien world, the body is the source of evil, though it is not in itself evil. Hence Philo divides the soul into two parts, one in alliance with the flesh, and the other separate and independent. Corresponding to this division there are two classes of men—those who live in the flesh and those who live in the spirit.

As man is by nature corrupt, even a virtuous life is of no avail, unless there is imparted to him the grace by which he is enabled to serve God (Extracts G). There are three ways to the higher life—practice of virtue, teaching and nature. Those who follow the first way are engaged in a never-ending struggle, while those who follow the path of knowledge attain to a higher life, and, compared with the former, feed upon 'strong meat', not upon 'milk fit for babes'. But the highest way of all is that of 'nature'; it is the way to peace, the joy of resignation, and purity of heart, and those who enter upon it at last 'see God', though only 'through a glass'. It is also described in such terms as 'hungering and thirsting after the ideal God', 'hungering after the noble life', 'being the slave of God'; and Philo also calls it the 'true riches', adding that there are but 'few who find it'.

Like St. Paul, Philo speaks of faith, hope and love as the fairest graces of the soul, the greatest being love. But, in strong contrast to the Apostle, he believes in the perpetual obligation of the Jewish ceremonial law, though he also speaks of faith as the 'most beautiful and blameless sacrifice'.

II. EXTRACTS FROM PHILO.

1. *Extracts from the De Mundi Opificio.*

§ 1. Of other law-givers some have set forth what they regarded as just in a naked and unadorned fashion, while others have overloaded their thoughts with a great mass of superfluous matter, and bewildered the minds of the people by the mythical fictions in which they have hidden the truth. Moses, on the other hand, has rejected both of these methods,—the one as inconsiderate, careless and unphilosophical, the other as mendacious and full of craft,—and has made the beginning of his laws entirely beautiful and admirable, neither declaring without preparation what ought to be done or not to be done, nor (since it was necessary to mould beforehand the minds of those who were to use his laws) inventing mythical fables himself, or adopting those which had been constructed by others. The beginning, as I have said, is most admirable, containing as it does an account of the creation of the world; the reason being that the world is in harmony with the law and the law with the world, so that the man who obeys the law is at the same time a citizen of the world,

and acts in conformity with the purpose of nature by which the whole world is regulated.

The beauty of the ideas impressed upon creation no poet or historian could ever worthily celebrate. They surpass speech and hearing, being too great and too venerable to be adapted to the senses of man. We must not, however, be silent on that account, but, inspired by our love to God, we must try to speak of them even beyond our powers. Though of ourselves we can do nothing, we must say what little we can, so far as our limited human faculty allows, when it is filled with the love and desire of wisdom. For, just as the smallest seal receives the impress of things of colossal magnitude, so perhaps the surpassing beauty of creation as recorded in the Law, overshadowing with its splendour the souls of those who come in contact with it, will be displayed in smaller characters, when we have first set forth that which must not be passed over in silence.

§ 2. Some, admiring the beauty of the world rather than the Maker of the world, have declared it to be ungenerated and eternal; they have plainly and expressly maintained the false doctrine of the absolute inactivity of God, whereas they ought to have been filled with wonder at the power of God as its Maker and Father, instead of reverencing the world beyond due measure. But Moses, who had reached the very summit of philosophy, and had also learned from the oracles of God the great principles operative in nature, was by his insight into nature aware that there is necessarily in things an active and a passive

principle, and that the active principle—the Reason of the whole—is perfectly pure and unmixed, being better than virtue, better than knowledge, and better than the absolutely good and the absolutely beautiful; while the passive principle, as without life and self-activity, is moved and shaped and animated by Reason, and thus transformed into an absolutely perfect product. Those who affirm the world to be ungenerated, unwittingly deprive it of what is most useful and most essential to piety. For reason shows us that a father and a maker take care of that which has been produced. A father seeks to secure the continuance of his children, an artificer the continuance of what he has made; whatever is pernicious and hurtful he removes by every means in his power, whatever is useful and advantageous he seeks to provide. But he who has not produced a thing has no peculiar interest in it. That is a worthless and pernicious doctrine, which assimilates the world to an anarchic State, in which there is no head or ruler or judge, by whom all things may be administered and governed. Now, the great Moses, viewing the uncreated as entirely different in nature from the visible world—for the whole visible world, as subject to process and change, is never the same in successive moments—has attributed eternity to that world which is invisible and grasped by thought as brother and kinsman, while he has appropriately spoken of the genesis of the sensible world. Since, then, our world is visible and sensible, it has also of necessity been created. There was therefore good reason for giving an account of its genesis, and in

doing so Moses has shewn himself to be a cosmologist of the most reverential spirit.

§ 3. Moses says that the world was constructed in six days ; not that the Creator had need of a length of time—for it is fitting that God should do all things at once, not only by his command, but by his mere thought,—but because what was created must also be ordered. Now, number is characteristic of order, and by the laws of nature *six* is the most productive of numbers. For, after the *unit*, it is the most perfect number, being equal in its parts, and being completed from them—*three* being *one-half* of six, *two one-third*, *one one-sixth*. Moreover, *six* is by nature, as it were, male and female, and unites in itself the power of each. For, in existing things the *odd* is *male*, and the *even* is *female* ; but three is the first of odd numbers, two of even numbers, and six is the product of both. And the world, being the most perfect of created things, must be constructed according to a perfect number, viz., six ; and, as it was to have in itself the generation of things from the conjunction of male and female numbers, it must contain the imprint of the first mixed number which is at once odd and even, since it was to embrace the species of the male which sows the seed and the female which is receptive of the seed.

§ 4. To each of the days, with the exclusion of the first, there is allotted one of the parts of the whole. Moses does not speak of the 'first' day, lest it should be numbered along with the others, but appropriately calls it 'one day', seeing in and ascribing to it the nature and desig-

nation of *unity*. Now, we must state as far as possible what is contained in it ; for it is impossible to deal with all that it contains, since it embraces the higher or intelligible world, as the account of it shows. For God, because he is God, knew beforehand that there can be no beautiful image without a beautiful model, nor any faultless sensible object which has not been fashioned after an archetype and idea grasped by reason ; and therefore, when he had determined to construct this visible world of ours, he produced beforehand the intelligible world, in order that, by using the incorporeal and god-like model, he might fashion the corporeal world, as a younger image of the older, containing as many sensible genera as are contained in the ideal world.

§ 5. Just as the idea of a city which he proposes to construct has no existence in space, but is stamped upon the soul of the architect ; so the intelligible world can have no other place than the divine Reason (*λόγος*), which gives order to the various ideas. For what other place can there be for the divine powers, which is capable of receiving and containing, I do not say all the powers, but any one of them in its purity ?

§ 6. It is also a divine power which has formed the world, a power which has its source in absolute goodness. For if it is asked why this world has been made, I think we shall not err if we answer, with one of the ancients, that the Father and Maker is good, and does not grudge to impart something of his own nature to matter, which in itself possesses nothing good, but is capable of becoming

all things. For matter in its primitive state was without order, without quality, without life or differentiation, and full of disorder and disharmony ; but it has been changed and transformed into the opposite and best,—the well-ordered, harmonious,—in a word, whatever is characteristic of the higher nature. God himself, incited by no adviser—for what other Being was there?—was minded to bestow rich and unlimited favours upon that which, without the divine grace, could obtain no good thing. But He has endowed it, not in proportion to the greatness of His own grace, which is infinite and eternal, but in proportion to the receptive power of the things upon which His grace is bestowed. For that which is made is not fit to receive all that God is willing to bestow, since His powers surpass those of the creature ; but the creature, being weak and unable to receive the divine grace in its fulness, would have rejected what was bestowed, had not God measured His bounty, allotting to each in due proportion what He lavished upon it.

To speak more plainly, the intelligible world is nothing but the Thought (*λόγος*) of God, or God as creating the world, just as the ideal city is nothing but the thought (*λογισμός*) of the architect, or the architect as conceiving in his mind the city which is to be built. This is the teaching of Moses, not mine. In giving an account of the origin of man, he expressly says, that man was 'formed after the image of God'. Now, if the part is an image of an image, manifestly the whole 'form', this total sensible world of ours, must be a larger copy of the

divine image than man. And it is further evident, that the archetypal seal, which we call the intelligible world, must be the archetypal pattern, the idea of ideas, the Reason (*λόγος*) of God.

§ 7. It is said that 'in the beginning God made the heavens and the earth'; meaning by 'beginning', not a beginning in time, as some imagine; for before the origination of the world time was not, but it has come into being either with the world or after it. For, as time is an interval in the movement of the heavens, there could be no movement prior to that which was moved, but movement must have been instituted either later than, or simultaneously with, the origin of the heavens; hence time must have come into being contemporaneously with the world, or posterior to it. To assert that time is older than the world is therefore rash and unphilosophical. Now, if by the 'beginning' is not meant the beginning in time, we must conclude that what is affirmed is the beginning in number; so that 'in the beginning God made' is equivalent to 'God made the heavens the first'. And in truth it is proper to say that the heavens came into being 'first', because it is the highest of all created things, and consists of the purest species of substance, since it was to be the most holy abode both of invisible and of visible gods. And if the Creator made all things at once, those things as beautiful none the less possessed order; for nothing is beautiful that is without order. Now, order is the consequence and connexion of things which precede and follow one another, not indeed in actual fact, but in the mind of him

who fashions them ; for only so will they be determinate, stable in their nature, and free from confusion. In the intelligible world, then, the Creator made the incorporeal heavens and the invisible earth and the form of air and of empty space. The former he called 'darkness', because air is by nature black ; the latter the 'deep' because empty space is exceedingly deep and immeasurable. Next He made the incorporeal substance of water and 'spirit' (*πνεῦμα*) ; seventh, and last of all, the substance of light, which also was incorporeal, being the ideal pattern of the sun and of all the light-bearing stars which were to be fixed in the heavens.

2. *Extracts from other writings of Philo.*

A.—II. 654 The divine realm is truly untrodden and inaccessible, nor is the purest intelligence able to ascend even to such a height as merely to touch it. It is impossible for man to have a direct vision of the self-existent Being. When it is said that man cannot see the 'face' of God, this is not to be taken literally, but is a figurative way of indicating that the self-existent Being is absolutely pure and unmixed, the specific nature and form of man being best known by his 'face'. For God does not say, 'I am by nature invisible'—for who can be more visible than He who has originated all other visible things?—but He says, 'Though I am by nature visible, no man hath seen Me'. And the cause lies in the weakness of the creature. To speak plainly, we must become God—which is impossible—before we can comprehend God.—I. 258.

In Deuteronomy xxxii, 39, we read: "Behold, behold that I am, and there is no God beside me." Now here God does not say, "Behold Me"—for it is impossible for the creature at all to comprehend God in His inner being—but, "Behold that I *am*", i.e., contemplate my existence; for it is enough for human reason to attain to the knowledge that there is and exists a Cause of the universe, and any attempt to go further and discover the essence or determinate nature of this Cause is the source of all folly. When Moses asked by what name he should designate the Being who sent him, the divine answer was (Exod. iii, 14): "I am He who *is*" (*Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν*); which was equivalent to, "It is my nature to be, not to be named" (*εἶναι πέφυκα, οὐ λέγεσθαι*).—I. 53 He who thinks that God has qualities, or that He is not one, or is not uncreated and imperishable, or is not immutable, injures himself, not God.—I. 181 It is impious to suppose that there is anything higher than the Cause of all things, since nothing is equal to Him, nothing a little lower, but everything after God is found to have descended by a whole genus.—II. 191 God must be conceived as the uncreated and eternal Cause of all things.—I. 229 Though He exists outside of creation, God has none the less filled the world with Himself.

B.—II. 154 The *λόγος* is two-fold in the universe and in the nature of man. In the universe there is, on the one hand, the *λόγος* which has to do with the incorporeal and archetypal ideas constituting the intelligible cosmos, and, on the other hand, the *λόγος* which is concerned with

visible things,—these being copies and imitations of the ideas from which this visible cosmos has been fashioned. In man, again, there is, on the one hand, the λόγος ἐνδιδάκτωρ (inner reason) and, on the other hand, the λόγος προφορικὸς (outer reason). The former is like a fountain, the latter, i.e., the expressed λόγος, is like the stream which flows forth from it. The one is situated in the ruling part; the other—that which is expressed—is in the tongue and mouth and the other organs of speech..... Two virtues have been assigned to it, *expression* and *truth*; for the λόγος of nature is true and expressive of all things, and the λόγος of the wise man, imitating the λόγος of nature, ought to be absolutely incapable of falsehood; it ought to honour truth, and obscure nothing the knowledge of which can benefit those instructed by it. Not but what there have been assigned to the two forms of the λόγος in us two appropriate virtues; to the λόγος προφορικὸς the virtue of *expression*, and to the λόγος in the mind the virtue of *truth*; for it is not fitting that the mind should accept anything false, or that speech should be a hindrance to the most precise expression of truth.—I. 161 God is *cause*, not *instrument*. Whatever comes into being is produced *by means* of an instrument, but *by* the cause of all things. In the production of anything there must co-operate (1) that *by which* it is made, (2) that *from which* it is made, (3) that *through which* it is made, (4) that *on account of which* it is made; in other words, the ‘cause’, the ‘matter’, the ‘instrument’, the ‘reason’ or ‘purpose’. Thus, in the production of a house, or a whole city, there

must co-operate (1) the architect, (2) the stones and timber, (3) the instruments. Now, the architect is the cause *by which* the house is made, the stones and timber are the 'matter' *from which* the building is made, the instruments are the things *through which* it is made, and the *reason why* it is made is to afford shelter and protection. Passing from particular things, look at the production of that greatest of all edifices or cities, the world, and you will find that God is the cause by whom it has been produced, that the 'matter' is the four elements out of which it has been composed, that the instrument is the *λόγος* of God through which it has been formed, and that the reason of its existence is the goodness of the Creator.—I. 502. The *λόγος* is neither unbegotten as God, nor begotten as man.

C.—I. 414 The *λόγος* is the eldest Son of God.—I. 308. The *λόγος* is the first-born Son of God.—I. 562. The eldest *λόγος* of the self-existent Being puts on the cosmos as a garment, for it arrays itself in earth and water and air and fire and their products, as the individual soul is clothed with the body, and the mind of the wise man with the virtues....The *λόγος* of the self-existent Being is the bond of the universe, which holds together and closely unites all its parts, preventing them from being loosened and separated.—I. 298 Once Greece flourished, but the Macedonians deprived it of its authority. Then Macedonia had its period of bloom, but it was gradually dismembered, and finally lost its power. Prior to the Macedonians the Persians were prosperous, but in a single day its vast and mighty kingdom was overthrown. And

now the Parthians are more powerful than the Persians, who but the other day were their masters. Egypt once had a long and glorious career, but like a cloud its dominion has passed away. Where are the Ethiopians, where Carthage and Libya? Where are the Kings of the Pontus? What has befallen Europe and Asia, and, in a word, the whole habitable world? Is it not tossed up and down, and agitated like a ship at sea,—at one time sailing under favoring winds, and again struggling with contrary gales? For the divine *λόγος*, which most men call 'fortune', moves in a circle. Ever flowing, it acts upon cities and nations, assigning the possessions of one to another, but always making for the conversion of the whole habitable world into one city, with that highest form of polity, democracy.—I. 411 The *λόγος* is the heavenly man.—II. 625 Why is it said that God 'made man after the image of God' (Gen. I, 27), as if He were speaking of another God, and not of Himself? The mode of statement is beautifully and wisely chosen. For no mortal could be made in the image of the most high God, the Father of the universe, but only in the image of the *second God*, who is the *λόγος* of the other. For it was fitting that the rational (*λογικός*) impression on the soul of man should be engraved by the divine *λόγος*, since the God prior to the *λόγος* is higher than every rational nature, and it was not lawful for any created being to be made like to Him who is above reason.

D.—I. 502 The Father has given to the *λόγος* the privilege of standing between the Creator and tha. which

He has made. And this same λόγος is a suppliant to the immortal God on behalf of the afflicted race of mankind.

I. 270, 562 The λόγος is the high priest, who mediates between God and man ; who is not to be defiled by touching the corpse of his father, i.e., the spirit, or of his mother, i.e., the sense.—I. 121-2 The λόγος is the manna ; for Moses said to the people, "This is the bread which the Lord hath given you to eat" (Exod. xvi, 13)..... The soul is taught by the prophet Moses, who tells it : "This is the bread, the food which God has given for the soul, explaining that God has brought it, His own Word and Reason ; for this bread which He has given us to eat is this Word of His"..... Let God enjoin the soul, saying to it, that "man shall not live by bread alone", speaking in a figure, "but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God".—I. 560 Moses exhorts him who is sufficiently swift of foot to press on without taking breath to the supreme λόγος of God, which is the fountain of wisdom, in order that, by drinking of that stream, he may find everlasting life.—I. 504 The soul has three parts, and each of these parts is divided into two ; as six parts thus arise, the seventh, which is the holy and divine λόγος is fitly regarded as the divider (τομέυς) of the whole.—I. 491 Each of the three victims (the heifer, the ram and the goat) he divided in the middle (Exod. xxxix, 3) ; the soul into rational and irrational, speech into true and false, sensation into definite and indefinite ; and these divisions he placed opposite to each other, rational to irrational, true to false, definite to indefinite,

leaving the birds (turtle-dove and pigeon) undisturbed. For the incorporeal and divine sciences cannot be divided into opposites at variance with each other.—I. 82 The 'rock cut away at the top' (Deut. viii, 15) is the wisdom of God, which He cut as topmost, first of all from His own powers, and from which He gives drink to souls that love God.

E.—I. 456 In Gen. xxvi, 5 we are told that Abraham 'kept all the Law of God'. Now, the Law (*νόμος*) is nothing but the Divine Word (*λόγος*), which commands what ought to be done, and forbids what ought not to be done; as scripture bears witness when it says, 'he received the Law from His words' (Deut. xxxiii, 4). If, then, the Word of God is the Law of God, and the righteous man keeps the Law, he also perfectly keeps the Word; so that, as scripture says, the actions of the wise man are the words of God.—II. 452 Men who are under the dominion of anger, or desire, or any other passion, or of intentional wickedness, are complete slaves, while those who love the Law are free. For the Law is unerring, right reason; it is not made by this or that man, being no transitory law of mortals, written on parchments or engraved on columns, the lifeless on the lifeless, but an eternal law stamped by the immortal nature on the immortal mind.—II. 195 The *λόγος* convinces of guilt; it is the *ἐλεγχος*, which dwells in and is inseparable from each soul: refusing to accept what is wrong, it always preserves its nature as a hater of evil and lover of virtue, being itself at once accuser and judge.

F.—I. 35 Every man in his reason is connected with the divine λόγος, being an ectype, or fragment, or spark of that blessed nature, while in the structure of his body he is connected with the rest of the world.—II. 367 A thousand things escape from and elude the human mind, because it is entangled in so great a crowd of impressions, which seduce and deceive it by false opinions. Thus the soul may be said to be buried in a mortal body, which may be called its tomb.—I. 266 It is possible for the Divine Spirit to dwell in the soul, but not to take up its permanent abode there. And why should we wonder at this? For there is nothing in this world the possession of which is stable and enduring, but mortal affairs are continually wavering in the balance, now inclining to one side and then to the other, and liable to perpetual alternations. The greatest cause of our ignorance is the flesh (σάρξ) and our connexion with the flesh. With this agrees the saying of Moses: because 'they are flesh, the Divine Spirit' is not able to abide in them..... Nor does anything so impede the growth of the soul as the fleshly nature. This is the first and main foundation of ignorance and want of understanding.—I. 372 So long as our irrational desires were not excited and did not cry out, our reason was established with some firmness; but when they began to fill the soul with their discordant cries, calling out and awakening the passions, they led to insurrection and strife.

G.—I. 203 Abraham confessed that virtue without the grace of God is of no avail.—I. 662 We must never imagine that we are ourselves able to wash and cleanse a

life full of stains without the grace of God.—I. 302 As milk is the food of babes, and wheat-cakes the food of men, so the soul must have a milk-like nourishment in its age of childhood, viz., the rudiments of education, while the nourishment adapted to men are the precepts of wisdom, temperance and the other virtues.

III. EXTRACT FROM THE SEPTUAGINT: GEN. I.

- 2' *Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν. Ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος, καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς*
 3 *ἀβύσσου· καὶ πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος.*
 4 *Καὶ εἶπεν ὁ Θεός, Γενηθήτω φῶς, καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς. Καὶ εἶδεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸ φῶς, ὅτι καλόν· καὶ διεχώρισεν ὁ Θεός*
 5 *ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ φωτός, καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σκότους. Καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸ φῶς ἡμέραν, καὶ τὸ σκότος ἐκάλεσε*
νύκτα· καὶ ἐγένετο ἑσπέρα, καὶ ἐγένετο πρωΐ, ἡμέρα μία.
 26 *Καὶ εἶπεν ὁ Θεός, Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα*
ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν.